Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

James R. Russell and Raylene Russell v. J Scott
Lundberg, Lundberg and Associates : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Willis Orton; Kirton and McConkie; Gary A. Weston; Richard M. Hymas; Nielsen and Senior,
P.C.; Attorneys for Apppellees.
Lester A. Perry; Hoole and King, L.C. ; Attorneys for Appellants .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Russell v. Lundberg, No. 20030938 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4636

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities;
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a professional corporation;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BACKMAN-STEWART
TITLE SERVICES, LTD, a Utah limited
partnership; CANYON ANDERSON;
RODNEY SERVICE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and JOHN DOES 1 through
10,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPFJIII
J. SCOTT LUNDB
LUNDBERG & ASSCI
AND RODNEY SERf

I

Case No. 20030931
UTAH C
UTAH
DOCUMENTS'
KFU
50
A10

DOCKET

fr|l|f^O-^3B-cA

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR'
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LE

Lester A. Perry, Esq.
Hoole & King, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorneys for Appellants

T OF APPEALS
RIEF

F
S

Gary A. Weston
Richard M. Hymas
Nielsen & Senior, P.C.
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400
5217 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 841|0[J
Attorneys for Appellees J. Hffbtt
Lundberg, Lundberg & As^|§ciates, and
Rodney Service Company

R. Willis Orton
Kirton & McConkie
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellees Backman Title Co,
Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd, and
Canyon Anderson
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

UTAH

m

TE COURTS

2Q0h

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other
similarly situated individuals and entities;
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG &
ASSOCIATES, a professional corporation;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BACKMAN-STEWART
TITLE SERVICES, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership; CANYON ANDERSON;
RODNEY SERVICE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and JOHN DOES 1 through
10,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG,
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES,
AND RODNEY SERVICE CO.

Case No. 20030938-CA

Defendants/Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS

Lester A. Perry, Esq.
Hoole & King, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorneys for Appellants

Gary A. Weston
Richard M. Hymas
Nielsen & Senior, P.C.
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400
5217 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Appellees J. Scott
Lundberg, Lundberg & Associates, and
Rodney Service Company

R. Willis Orton
Kirton & McConkie
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellees Backman Title Co.,
Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd., and
Canyon Anderson
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

A.

Cases

iv

B.

Rules

v

C.

Statutes

vi

D.

Other Authorities

vii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW

1

A.

Issues Presented

1

B.

Standard of Review

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the
Court Below

3

Statement of Facts

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

16

ARGUMENTS

19

B.

I.

THE LUNDBERG PARTIES DID NOT OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
THE RUSSELLS, AND THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE RUSSELLS' BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD CLAIMS

4842-6971-1616.LU593.001

i

19

A.

Under Utah Law, A Trustee Does Not Owe A Fiduciary Duty To The
Trustor In The Absence Of A Confidential Or Similar Relationship
Between Them

B.

Where There Was No Confidential Relationship Between The Lundberg
Parties And The Russells. No Fiduciary Duty Was Owed
24

C.

The Undisputed Evidence Establishes That Mr. Lundberg Complied
With His Statutory Duties In Foreclosing The Russells' Trust Deed In
Accordance With The Utah Trust Deed Foreclosure Statute
1.

2.

3.

II.

III.

IV.

20

26

A Trustee's Duties are Limited by Statute and Mr. Lundberg
Complied With All of Those Statutory Duties

26

The Russells Have Misconstrued the Language of § 57-1-31(1)
to Imply a Non-existent Duty Owing by the Lundberg Parties to
the Russells

30

Attorneys. Acting as Trustees. Would Violate the Conflict of
Interest Provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct If the
Performance of Their Statutory Duties Imposed By the Trust
Deed Foreclosure Statute Created a Fiduciary Duty Owing to
Both the Beneficiary and the Trustor

33

MR. LUNDBERG HAD NO CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO THE RUSSELLS
BECAUSE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID CONTRACT HAVE
NOT BEEN MET

35

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF RODNEY ON THE RUSSELLS' FIDUCIARY DUTY,
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND CONTRACT CLAIMS

36

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE LUNDBERG
PARTIES AND RODNEY WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE
RUSSELLS5 OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION

37

A.

To Defeat A Summary Judgment Motion. The Russells Must Produce
Admissible Evidence Showing That There Is A Genuine Issue Of
Material Fact. Which The Russells Have Failed To Do

4842-6971-1616.LU593.001

ii

37

B.

C.

D.

E.

The Russells Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Establishing
Their Claim Of Fraud Against The Lundberg Parties And Rodney

38

The Russells Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Establishing
Their Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Against The Lundberg
Parties And Rodney

39

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail
Against The Lundberg Parties And Rodney On Their Unjust
Enrichment Claim As a Matter of Law

40

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail
Against The Lundberg Parties Or Rodney On Their Unfair Practices
Act Claim As A Matter of Law

41

1.

2.

F.

G.

H.

The Russells Lack Standing to Assert a Claim Against the
Lundberg Parties or Rodney Under the UP A

41

The UPA Does Not Apply to the Transactions at Issue in This
Action and the Lundberg Parties and Rodney Have Not
Violated the UPA

43

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Lundberg Parties And
Rodney Were Entitled To Judgment Against The Russells On Their
Civil Conspiracy Claim

46

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail
On Their Punitive Damages Claim as a Matter of Law

48

The Court Should Summarily Affirm The District Court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment In Favor Of The Lundberg Parties And
Rodney On The Causes Of Action Not Addressed In The Russells'
Appeal Brief

49

CONCLUSION

49

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

50

4842-6971-1616 LU593 001

hi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1998)

37, 38

American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah
1996)

40

AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997) . 19
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242 (1986)

38

Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1994)

40

Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)

21, 22, 26, 33, 34

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989)

3

Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998)

36

Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 146 P.2d 203 (Utah 1944)

43

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317 (1986)

37

City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991)

3

Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978)

47

Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 1A3 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987) . . 28, 29
D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989)

38

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980)

34

First Security Bank v. Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987)

29

First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253
(Utah 1989)

22, 23, 34

Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App. 373, 81 P.3d 105

23, 24, 34

4842-6971-1616 LU593 001

iv

Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 70 P.3d 1
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982)
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983)

19
24
37, 38

Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986)

41

Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303,293 P.2d 700 (1956)

47

Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987)
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983)

39,46, 47
41, 42

Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah App. 1988)

29

Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) . . . . 39
Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1999)

35

Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952)

38

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d
1028 (Utah 1985)

35, 36

Rio Vista Oil, Ltd. v. The Southland Corp., 667 F.Supp. 757 (D.Utah 1987)
Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994)
Thomock v. Cook,, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979)
Utah Foam Products Co. v. The Upjohn Co. 154 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 1998)
Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985)

42
37, 38
38
43, 44
33

Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996) . . . . 41
Rules
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
4842-6971-1616.LU593 001

37
38
V

Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7

33

Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 13(c)

45

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-1

42

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-3(l)(a)

43

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-3(l)(b)(i)

44

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-3(3)

45

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-17

43

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-404(d)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(1)

26

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(4)

26

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-20

26

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21

33, 35

Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-21.5(2)(b) (2001)

30

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5(4)(a) and (b)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-22(1)

27

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23

27

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25

21

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(2)

28

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(3)

28

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26(4)

28

4842-6971-1616XU593.001

VI

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2

?1

Utah Code Ann. s : . - ; _

',-

1 t.:h ( ...J- ' -

' "'

"

i)

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2" .

28, 32

Utah Code Ann. Jj x-,-.'
luhv

. ,i:

;

;

~

'.u, '-1, P

•' '

_.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(a)

48

Other Authorities
22 ,M

.. him

v at § 741 (1988)

48
0,c

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed

4842-6971-1616.LU593.001

Vll

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Issues Presented.
1.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Lundberg, as trustee,

owed a limited statutory duty to the Russells, but that Mr. Lundberg, the Lundberg Firm,
and Rodney did not owe a fiduciary duty to the Russells in the absence of a confidential
relationship between them?
2.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and

Rodney did not have a confidential relationship with the Russells at the time the Trust
Deed was executed or at any time thereafter, and, therefore, the Lundberg Parties and
Rodney did not owe a fiduciary or similar duty to the Russells?
3.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and

Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Russells5 claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and constructive fraud?
4.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Lundberg satisfied all

statutory duties owed by him to the Russells in connection with the foreclosures of the
Russells' Trust Deed?
5.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and

Rodney had no contractual relationship with the Russells, and therefore owed no
contractual duty to them, and that the Lundberg Parties were entitled to judgment as a
4842-6971-1616XU593.0O1

1

matter of km t HI (lie R ussclls' claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing?
*

Whether the district coun cv>riccu\ -,i >JA .• . *

• •. •;- ,? N \ nk . u M >.• •

,111 \ admissible evidence that the Lundberg Parties or Rodney made any misrepresentation
to them, or reasonably relied upon any misrepresentation, and therefore the Lundberg
Parties and Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matlc i of In » on the Russells" claims
•• *iau ; <e\: iieghgem :-r.sren-esentation? •,.
Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and
Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 1:1 J K > - C us ..lamis

•• . ;;st

enrichment where 11n • 1111«11111111i"d e\ ide11ee established that the Lundberg Parties and
Rodney had not been unjustly enriched, either by the Russells or otherwise?
8.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that i... ».._..:UL .-.-. :\v ^> .41 ..

RodiiL-^ ••• ^: -.-jnuiL

uu,:u

- •'n^ of tew on the Russells' claim for illegal

price discrimination in violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act where the Russells
lacked standing to pursue that claim and where the undisputed evidence csiaousiu;> •: :.
the I iiiitlbeii" Parlies and Kodiu'v did noi \ ioliiie The 1 H'A?
9.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and

Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on me i .::seii^

.;

(

conspiracy where lln: Russell •. tailed In present t lenr and convincing evidence of any
illegal conspiracy?

4842-6971-1616 XU593,001
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10.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Lundberg Parties and

Rodney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Russells' claim for punitive
damages?
B.

Standard of Review,
Where the claims against the Lundberg Parties and Rodney were decided on

summary judgment, the district court's decision with respect to those claims are reviewed
for correctness. The facts relating to those claims are viewed in the light most favorable
to the Russells and no deference is given to the district court's conclusions. City
Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1991); Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 643-37 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 to -36 (Utah's trust deed foreclosure statutes).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.
Mr. Lundberg, as trustee under a Trust Deed executed by the Russells on their

property, commenced three separate non-judicial trust deed foreclosures on the property
on behalf of the trust deed beneficiary. Each foreclosure was in response to a separate
loan default by the Russells. On each occasion, the Lundberg Firm purchased a title
insurance product known as a "trustee's sale guaranty" ["TSG"] from Backman-Stewart
Title Services, Ltd. to identify the legal owner of the property and any liens or

4842-6971-1616 LU593 001
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encumbrances on the property Mr. Lundberg has an ownership interest in BackmanStewart Title and its parent company, Backman Title Co. With the third foreclosure, the
Lundberg Firm hired Rodney ^
• ndlv * ii s

... .

.

•• !.•<>

•. *

* '

» handle the posting and publication of the notice of sale. The

Lundberg Firm invoiced the beneficiary for the actual amounts it paid to BackmanStewart for the XSGs and to Rodney foi the posting ami publishing services in accordance
vuth ::- • :*/".-:> i

fi.^h beneficiary reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for those

amounts. The Lundberg Parties complied with all statutory duties required of a trustee in
connection with the foreclosures.
•; Prior to each foreclosi ire sale of the property, the Russells cured their default and
reinstated their loan by paying to the beneficiary the amounts owed on their loan, together
with the costs actually incurred by the beneficiary in connection w llli eat. li )«^vcl< vsuri;,
Thcku^,-

:

!

:

mdher" D-rtio; and Rodney, along with the Backman

Parties and Backman-Stewart5 s president, Canyon Anderson, claiming that the Russells
were required to pay more than the actual costs incurred D\ .: .• vuirci /h:r> :
tniw licfauiis aiui :

•*:*!'" ^v-:-

!*. -\ base tliis claim on the fact that the Lundberg

Parties received commissions from Backman-Stewart resulting from Mr. Lundberg's
ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large amouni nl business lie brings l<»
BacLmtn->io\*-

' ^

;

<*• l*;i^ th^ir claim on the fact that Rodney received a

commission from the newspaper in which it published the notice of sale and that Mr.
Lundberg owned an interest in Rodney.

4842-6971-1616.IIJ593.001
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The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lundberg Parties on the
Russells' first four causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach
of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) pursuant to its
Memorandum Decision entered September 30, 2002, and resulting Partial Summary
Judgment for Lundberg Defendants entered October 30, 2002.
The district court also entered judgment in favor of Rodney on those first four
claims, as well as in favor of the Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the remaining causes of
action (restitution based on mistake of fact, restitution based on mistake of law, tortious
payment of money, unjust enrichment, wrongful collection, liability for intended
consequences, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, violation of the Unfair
Practices Act, and punitive damages) pursuant to its Memorandum Decision entered
August 14, 2003, and resulting Order Granting the Lundberg Parties Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Granting Rodney
Service Co.'s Motion for Summary judgment, Granting the Backman Defendants' Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class entered
on September 8, 2003.
B.

Statement of Facts,
J. Scott Lundberg ["Mr. Lundberg"] is an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah.

[R. 145, f 2.] Lundberg & Associates ["the Lundberg Firm"], a professional corporation
owned by Mr. Lundberg, is a law firm. [R. 145, Tf 3.] Mr. Lundberg and the Lundberg
Firm ["Lundberg Parties"] do real estate loan foreclosure work, including conducting, as

4842-6971-1616.LU593.0Q!
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Ii iislee or as legal counsel for the trustee, non-judicial power of sale foreclosures on real
property located in Utah. [R. 145, *§ 4; R. 906, f 3.]
Rodney :> j r .•* . - ••-, t .i >

i' J** *<' ; - * •

" *-.rp

;!]<>>] tb:n w ^ organized

(Mi Mu\ 1 2, 2000. Rodney's business involves the posting and publishing of notices of
trustee's sale for trustees and attorneys in connection with their work in foreclosing trust
deeds. .

K.U?:.'

•*.

p.»r;.n.

*" j" ^\v.;r.\vr,:1bv

,. •;" .1

]\h • indberg (89%) and his son, Derek Lundberg (11%). Derek Lundberg, as President
of Rodney, handled the company's day-to-day operations during that time, i roni April
22, 2002, to the present, Rodney has been o\\

IK-M ^I..\

* *;u

-^ - '

-I^TU'S

family, and not by Mr. Lundberg [R. 655, ^f 5.]
Before Rodney was formed, the Lundberg Finn paid individuals to post the notices
of trustee's sale in connection wiu. LK_.; .or..\ii\m

. hx:ru F- P \ r - :

beneficiary under the trust deed being foreclosed or its servicing agent ["beneficiary"] the
actual amount that it paid to those who posted the notices. [R. 662, f 3,] After Rodney
was formed, the Lundberg Finn contracted t • Ith R odney to hi iidle the posting of its
,,

° r ' v l i ^ , " v ^i >ii, r

tc Lundberg Firm paid Rodney a flat fee of $65.00 for posting the

notices for each foreclosure, and charged the beneficiary the actual amount that it paid to
Rodney for handling the posting sen x ^
l Vf. »?v R onn-?v was formed, the Lundberg Firm arranged with newspapers to
publish its notices of trustee's sale, and charged the beneficiary the actual amount that it
paid to publish the notices, [K. ()t)2,^| :>,| , \\\cv Rodney '^

4842-6971-1616.LU593.001
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i

\--v-. '•*•! ::i<:;vv.: »'

contracted with Rodney to handle the publishing of its foreclosure notices. In most cases
Rodney charged the Lundberg Firm the same amount it was charged by the newspaper
that published the notices, plus an administrative fee of $30.00 per foreclosure. When
Rodney was able to negotiate with the Intermountain Commercial Record ["ICR"] a flat
fee for publishing the notices placed by Rodney in ICR's newspaper, Rodney charged the
Lundberg Firm the same flat fee that it paid to ICR, plus Rodney's administrative fee.
Because of the large volume of work given by Rodney to ICR, Rodney later negotiated a
commission arrangement with ICR, whereby ICR paid Rodney a commission each month
based upon the amount of business referred. Thereafter, Rodney did not charge the
Lundberg Firm an administrative fee for handling the publication of notices placed in
ICR's newspaper. In all cases, the Lundberg Firm paid Rodney the amount that Rodney
billed the Lundberg Firm for handling the publication of the foreclosure notices, the
Lundberg Firm billed that same amount to the beneficiary for whom the foreclosure was
being performed, and the beneficiary reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that same
amount. [R. 656-657,fflf8-10; R. 662-663, f 6.]
At no time has Mr. Lundberg or the Lundberg Firm received any compensation or
commissions from Rodney in connection with the posting and publication services
provided by Rodney. Mr. Lundberg's only remuneration from Rodney was his share of
the profits earned by Rodney during the time that he was a part owner of the company.
[R. 660, If 29; R. 663,17.]

4842-6971-1616.LU593.001
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Mr. Lundberg prefers to use one title company to provide the title work needed for
his foreclosure work. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mr. Lundberg used BackmanStewart Title Services Ltd. ["Backman-Stewart"]. In November 1991, Mr. Lundberg
began using another local title company, but, by the mid-1990s, he again was using
Backman-Stewart, although, as a licensed title insurance agent, he continued to do some
of the title work himself. [R. 906,fflf4-5; see R. 664, % 13.]
In approximately 1997, Canyon Anderson ["Mr. Anderson"], the President of
Backman Title Co. ["Backman Title"], the general partner of Backman-Stewart,
approached Mr. Lundberg about becoming an owner of Backman-Stewart. [R. 664, If 12;
R. 906, Tf 6.] Mr. Lundberg told Mr. Anderson that he would be interested if he could be
satisfied that the Utah Insurance Commission would not have a problem with him, an
attorney with a loan foreclosure practice, having an ownership interest in, and receiving
remuneration from, the title company from which Mr. Lundberg and his firm purchased
title products used in their foreclosure practice. [R. 906, f 6.]
Mr. Anderson later informed Mr. Lundberg that he had been advised by the
Insurance Commission that there was no reason that Mr. Lundberg could not be an owner
in Backman-Stewart, and receive compensation for his ownership interest in the company
and for referring work to the company, simply because he was an attorney and a licensed
title agent authorized to do title work and collect premiums for that work. [R. 907, ^f 7.]
Mr. Lundberg thereupon purchased a 30% limited partnership interest in BackmanStewart, and became a director of Backman-Stewart. In late 2000 or early 2001, that

4842-6971-1616.LU593.001
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interest was converted to a 15% ownership interest in Backman Title, and a 1%
ownership interest in Backman-Stewart. [R. 664, ^f 13; R. 907, f 7.]
The Lundberg Firm often purchases a trustee's sale guarantee ["TSG"] from a title
insurance company for use in its foreclosures. A TSG is similar to a preliminary title
report or title commitment, in that it identifies the legal owner and the legal description of
the property, and any liens or encumbrances on the property. A major difference between
a TSG and a preliminary title report is the liability of the entity that issues the TSG or the
title report if an error is made. If inaccurate information is contained in a TSG, the title
insurance company that issues it will be liable for all damages incurred up to the amount
of the lien being foreclosed. With a preliminary title report, only the local title company
will be liable for any error in the report, and that liability generally is limited to the
amount paid for the report. A TSG provides much greater protection to the trustee and
the lender who are relying on the information contained therein, and, for that reason, are
commonly used in the industry. [R. 663-664, ^f 8.]
The amount that Backman-Stewart and other title insurance companies in Utah
charge for a TSG must be approved by the Utah Insurance Commission. [R. 664, ^[ 9.]
The amount that Backman-Stewart charges the Lundberg Firm for TSGs is at the rate
approved by the Insurance Commission and is the same amount that it charges all other
TSG purchasers. [R. 664, f 11.] When the Lundberg Firm purchases a TSG for a
foreclosure that it is handling, the Lundberg Firm charges the beneficiary the same
amount that it paid to the title insurance company for the TSG. [R. 664, ^f 10.]
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The practice in the title insurance industry is that if a TSG shows prior liens or
encumbrances on the property being foreclosed for which releases should have been
obtained when the loan was made, the title company issuing the TSG will have its
employees, its law firm, or some other third party do the "title curative work" that is
necessary to remove those liens and encumbrances from the record title. The title
company usually does not charge the lender or trustee any additional amount for the title
curative work but customarily bears that expense itself. [R. 907, Tf 8.]
During 1998-2000, the years in which the events at issue in this lawsuit occurred,
the Lundberg Parties performed legal services, such as title curative work, for BackmanStewart, and were compensated by Backman-Stewart for those services. [R. 665, ^f 14; R.
907, ^9.] Backman-Stewart also paid commissions to the Lundberg Parties in
recognition of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large
volume of business that the Lundberg Parties provided to Backman-Stewart. The
commissions were not based upon a set percentage of the referred business. The
Lundberg Parties did not receive commissions that were directly attributable to the
amount paid by the Lundberg Firm to Backman-Stewart for a TSG obtained in connection
with any particular foreclosure. [R. 665, f 15.]
The commissions paid to the Lundberg Parties were determined periodically after
Backman-Stewart subtracted from the total revenue that it received from the TSGs and
other title products and services purchased by the Lundberg Parties the actual costs
incurred by Backman-Stewart for the products and services purchased by the Lundberg
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Parties, including the premiums paid to the underwriter, the cost of searching, examining
and typing the TSGs, amounts for other overhead items, and a profit margin for
Backman-Stewart. [R. 665, ^ 16.] Backman-Stewart did not sell the TSGs to the
Lundberg Parties at less than actual cost, even if one considers the commissions that were
paid to the Lundberg Parties. [R. 665, f 17.]
In August 2000, to make certain that his relationship with Backman-Stewart would
continue to have the approval of the Insurance Commission, Mr. Lundberg proposed to
Backman-Stewart that the arrangement by which he would be compensated for his
ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and for the large volume of work that he provided
to Backman-Stewart be changed. Mr. Lundberg understood that Section 31 A-23-404(d)
of the Insurance Code provided that a person may share compensation received for the
issuance of a title insurance policy only to the extent that he "contributed to the search
and examination of the title or other services connected with it." U.C.A. § 31A-23404(d). To ensure that there would be no question regarding their compliance with the
statute, Mr. Lundberg proposed that he make the final review of, and sign on behalf of
Backman-Stewart, TSGs initially prepared by Backman-Stewart personnel in connection
with the Lundberg Parties' foreclosures and that the Lundberg Parties do the title curative
work necessary to clear the titles on the properties that are the subject of those TSGs.
Backman-Stewart agreed to the proposal, and a written contract was signed,
acknowledging the agreement. [R. 907-908,ffi[10-11; R. 910-913.]
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In late 2000 or early 2001, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Lundberg met with R. Peter
Stevens ["Mr. Stevens"], the Assistant Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Commission,
and discussed the nature of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in, and business
relationship with, Backman-Stewart, and the compensation that Mr. Lundberg received
from Backman-Stewart. [R. 908, f 12.] They answered Mr. Stevens' questions and
provided him with the information he requested. [R. 908, ^[ 13.] Neither Mr. Stevens nor
anyone else from the Commission ever notified Mr. Lundberg that the Commission had
any concern about his relationship with, or the remuneration that he received from,
Backman-Stewart, or that such relationship or remuneration was improper or violated
Utah law in any way. [R. 909,114.] 1
In August 1997, James R. Russell and Raylene Russell ["the Russells"] obtained a
loan from One Stop Mortgage, Inc. ["One Stop"] to purchase a property at 1954 West
Brynn Circle, West Jordan, Utah ["the Property"]. As part of that transaction, the
Russells signed a promissory note ["Note"] and a deed of trust on the Property ["Trust
!

In 2002, subsequent to the events at issue in this litigation, the Utah Legislature
amended the trust deed foreclosure statute to prohibit a trustee from receiving a
commission or referral based fee for referring business, including title work or posting or
publishing services, to a third party. U.C.A. § 57-1-21.5(4)(a) and (b)(2002). This
amendment does not apply to fees received by a trustee for acting as legal counsel or for a
nonpreferred participation in net profits based upon an ownership interest not otherwise
prohibited by law. In March 2002, to comply with this change in the law, the manner by
which compensation was paid to the Lundberg Parties by Backman-Stewart was changed.
Since March 1, 2002, commissions have not been paid to the Lundberg Parties. Instead,
Backman-Stewart has paid the Lundberg Firm a set fee each month to compensate it for
the title curative work that it performs for Backman-Stewart, and Mr. Lundberg has
received a monthly salary for his work as an officer of Backman-Stewart and for
reviewing and signing TSGs and other title products. [R. 909, f 15.]
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Deed"]. [R. 145, | 5.] As beneficiary under the Trust Deed, One Stop designated Mr.
Lundberg to be the trustee, serving at its will and discretion. [R. 145, f 6.]
The Lundberg Parties did not give any information, or make any representations, to
the Russells, or have any contact with them, at or prior to the time the Russells executed
the Trust Deed. In fact, the Lundberg Parties had no contacts or communications with the
Russells whatsoever until after the Russells had defaulted on the Note and Trust Deed.
[R. 146,17.]
One Stop sold the loan, and assigned its interest in the Note and Trust Deed, to
another lender, Aames Capital Corporation ["Aames"], a client of the Lundberg Parties.
As the new beneficiary under the Trust Deed, Aames chose to have Mr. Lundberg
continue serving as trustee. [R. 146, f 8.]
The Russells defaulted on their payments on the Note in late 1997. [R. 146, «f| 9.]
At Aames' request, the Lundberg Parties began the first foreclosure of the Trust Deed.
Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, prepared a notice of default which was recorded with the Salt
Lake County Recorder's Office and mailed to the Russells. [R. 146, ^f 10.] When the
Russells did not cure the default within three months, a notice of trustee's sale was mailed
to the Russells and posted and published in accordance with Utah law. [R. 146, 11.]
Rodney was not involved with the posting or publishing of this notice. [R. 657, If 13.]
The Lundberg Firm purchased a TSG in connection with this first foreclosure for
$767.00, and invoiced Aames for the $767.00 that it paid for the TSG. Aames
reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that amount. [R. 666, ^ 23.]
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The Lundberg Firm notified the Russells, at their request, of the amount they
needed to pay to cure their default and reinstate their loan. This amount included all
amounts owed on the Note, plus the actual fees and costs incurred by the beneficiary in
connection with the foreclosure. [R. 666-667, f 24.] The Russells cured the default by
paying that amount to the beneficiary. [R. 147, f 12.]
In November 1998, the Russells again defaulted on the Note. [R. 147,113.] At
Aames' request, the Lundberg Parties commenced a second foreclosure by recording and
mailing to the Russells a new notice of default. [R. 147, ^ 14.] When the Russells did not
cure the default within three months, a new notice of trustee's sale was mailed to the
Russells and posted and published in accordance with Utah law. [R. 147, % 15.] Rodney
had no involvement with the posting or publication of this notice. [R. 147, f 15.]
The Lundberg Firm purchased a TSG in connection with this second foreclosure
from Backman-Stewart for $760.00, and invoiced Aames for the $760.00 that it paid for
the TSG. Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that amount. [R. 667-668, Tf 30; R.
671-682; R. 683.]
The Lundberg Firm again notified the Russells, at their request, of the amount
needed to cure the default and reinstate their loan. [R. 668, If 31; R. 684.] The Russells
cured the default by paying the beneficiary the amounts owed on the Note, plus the fees
and costs incurred by the beneficiary in connection with this foreclosure. [R. 147, f 16.]
In March 2000, the Russells again defaulted on the Note [R. 148, f 17.], and, at
Aames' request, the Lundberg Parties commenced a third foreclosure by recording and
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mailing to the Russells a new notice of default. [R. 148, f 18] When the Russells did not
cure the default within three months, a notice of trustee's sale was mailed to the Russells
and posted and published in accordance with Utah law. [R. 148,119.]
Rodney handled the posting of this notice for the Lundberg Firm. Rodney charged
the Lundberg Firm $65.00 for the posting services, and the Lundberg Firm paid that
amount to Rodney. The Lundberg Firm invoiced Aames for the $65.00 that it paid to
Rodney, and Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for that amount. [R. 658, f 19; R.
669,1f36;R. 685.]
Rodney also handled the publishing of the notice of trustee's sale for the Lundberg
Firm. Rodney charged the Lundberg Firm $143.40 for publishing this notice, which was
the same amount that Rodney was charged by ICR to print the notice in its newspaper.
Rodney received a $30.00 commission from ICR, and therefore did not charge the
Lundberg Firm its normal $30.00 administrative fee. The Lundberg Firm invoiced
Aames for the $143.40 that it paid to Rodney, and Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm
for that amount. [R. 659, ^ 20; R. 669, ^ 37; R. 685.]
The Lundberg Firm purchased a TSG for this foreclosure from Backman-Stewart
for $757.00, and invoiced Aames for that amount. Aames reimbursed the Lundberg Firm
for the $757.00 that it had paid for the TSG. [R. 669-670, at ^ 38; R. 686-698.]
In September 2000, the Lundberg Firm notified Mr. Russell, at his request, of the
amount that had to be paid to cure the default and reinstate the loan. [R. 670, ^f 39; R.
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699.] The Russells cured the default by paying Aames the amounts owed on the Note,
including the fees and costs incurred by Aames in the foreclosure. [R. 670, f 40.]
In all three foreclosures of the Russells5 Trust Deed, the Lundberg Firm invoiced
the beneficiary for the fees and costs actually incurred and paid by the Lundberg Firm in
connection with those foreclosures, and in each case those fees and costs were reimbursed
by the beneficiary to the Lundberg Firm. [R. 148, If 21.]
At no time did the Lundberg Parties serve as legal counsel for the Russells or have
a confidential relationship of any kind with them. [[R. 148,123; R. 149, f 24.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to the decisions of the Utah appellate courts, a trust deed trustee has
limited statutory duties when conducting a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure, but, in the
absence of a confidential or similar relationship with the trustors, does not owe the trustor
a fiduciary or other independent duty. The undisputed evidence establishes that the
Lundberg Parties did not have a confidential or similar relationship with the Russells.
Thus, the Lundberg Parties owed no fiduciary duty to the Russells, and were entitled to
judgment on the Russells' breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud claims.
The undisputed evidence also established that Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, fully
complied with his statutory duties to both the Russells and the beneficiary in foreclosing
the Russells' Trust Deed. The Russells were not required to pay more than the actual
costs incurred by the beneficiary to cure their defaults and reinstate their loan. The
Lundberg Firm invoiced the beneficiary for the actual amounts that it paid to Backman-
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Stewart to purchase the TSGs and the actual amount that it paid to Rodney for the posting
and publishing services that Rodney provided in connection with the third foreclosure.
Although the Lundberg Parties received commissions from Backman-Stewart arising
from Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in the company and the large volume of business
that the Lundberg Parties provided to Backman-Stewart, and Rodney received a
commission from the newspaper that published the notice of sale relating to the Russells'
property, the fact remains that the Russells only were charged for the actual costs incurred
by the beneficiary, which were the actual amounts paid by the Lundberg Firm for those
products and services.
The Rules of Professional Conduct that apply to Mr. Lundberg and other attorney
trustees precludes the Russells' argument that the trust deed foreclosure statute imposes
an independent fiduciary duty on Mr. Lundberg, as a trustee, where his primary duty
under the statute is to the beneficiary.
The Lundberg Parties had no contractual relationship with the Russells, and, as a
result, the district court properly entered judgment against the Russells on their breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.
Rodney had no confidential or contractual relationship with the Russells, and
therefore it was entitled to judgment on the Russells' fiduciary and contract claims.
The evidence establishes that neither the Lundberg Parties nor Rodney made any
false representations to the Russells, and therefore they were entitled to judgment on the
Russells' fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.
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The Lundberg Parties and Rodney were not unjustly enriched by the Russells. or
otherwise.
The Russells lack standing to pursue their claim under the Utah Unfair Practices
Act, where they are not in the business of selling TSGs and did not purchase TSGs from
Backman-Stewart. In addition, there is no evidence of any violation by the Lundberg
Parties of the UPA. Backman-Stewart charged the Lundberg Firm the same amount for
the TSGs it purchased that it charged to other TSG buyers. There also is no evidence that
the business relationship between the Lundberg Parties and Backman-Stewart created a
monopoly or lessened competition in any way.
The Russells failed to present any evidence that the Lundberg Parties or Rodney
conspired to commit any unlawful action against the Russells. Accordingly, the Russells
cannot prevail on their civil conspiracy claim.
The Russells5 punitive damages claim fails as a matter of law where judgment was
properly entered on all of the Russells' underlying claims. Moreover, the Russells have
not presented any evidence that would support their punitive damages claim.
The Russells have not argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting
judgment against them on their claims for restitution based on mistake of fact or mistake
of law, tortious payment of money, wrongful collection, or liability for intended
consequences. That being the case, the Court should affirm the district court's decision
granting judgment against the Russells on those claims.
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ARGUMENTS
I. THE LUNDBERG PARTIES DID NOT OWE A FIDUCIARY
DUTY TO THE RUSSELLS, AND THE DISTRICT COURT
PROPERLY DISMISSED THE RUSSELLS' BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD CLAIMS
The Russells have no cause of action against the Lundberg Parties unless they can
show a duty owed and breached. A duty arises only by statute, contract or, if a
relationship exists which imposes an independent duty, by operation of law.2 Whether a
duty exists is a question of law. AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corporation of
America, 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997).
Mr. Lundberg, as trustee under the Russells5 Trust Deed, owed the Russells a
statutory duty, albeit a limited one. Recognizing (but not admitting) that Mr. Lundberg
fulfilled his statutory duty, the Russells argue that they had a confidential or contractual
relationship with the Lundberg Parties which created for the Lundberg Parties a fiduciary
duty, and that the Lundberg Parties breached that fiduciary duty. The undisputed facts
demonstrate, however, that there was no such contractual or confidential relationship
between the parties, and the Lundberg Parties owed no fiduciary duty to the Russells.
The Russells have repeatedly alleged - without any factual basis whatsoever - that
the Lundberg Parties and Rodney engaged in dishonest, fraudulent and illegal conduct by
accepting "kickbacks" from Backman-Title and the Intermountain Commercial Record
and by requiring defaulting trustors such as the Russells to pay excessive fees and costs to
2

See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 43 ("Contractual duties exist
by mutual agreement of the parties, while tort duties exist by imposition of society").
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cure their defaults and reinstate their loans. Cutting through the slanderous rhetoric and
false accusations in which the Russells clothe their allegations, what the Russells actually
are arguing is that a trust deed trustee, accepting and performing the duties and
responsibilities statutorily imposed, may not have a pecuniary interest in the businesses
that provide logistic support for the performance of those duties. They offer no reason
why that should be the case. Their position is not supported by any Utah statute or
appellate decision, and is without merit.
A.

Under Utah Law, A Trustee Does Not Owe A Fiduciary Duty To The Trustor
In The Absence Of A Confidential Or Similar Relationship Between Them,
The Russells incorrectly state that the district court determined that Mr. Lundberg

did not owe them any duty of any kind. In its Memorandum Decision dated September
30, 2002, the district court correctly observed that there were procedural duties owing
under the trust deed foreclosure statute and that Mr. Lundberg fully complied with those
statutory duties. [R. 285.] What the district court did do was reject the Russells'
argument that Mr. Lundberg owed a fiduciary duty to the Russells simply because he was
the trustee under their Trust Deed. [R. 284.]
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-19 to -36 govern the rights, powers and duties of trustors,
beneficiaries and trustees under a trust deed. In two Utah Supreme Court cases, the duties
owed by a trustee to a trustor were addressed. In both cases, the Court held that a
fiduciary duty was owed by the trustee to the trustor only as a consequence of a
confidential relationship existing between them at the time the trust deed was executed.
Those cases, as well as a recent decision of this Court, clarify the circumstances that must
4842-6971-1616.LU593.001
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be established in order for a trustee to have a fiduciary duty to a trustor - circumstances
not present in this case.
In Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court first
addressed whether a bank serving as both beneficiary and trustee under a trust deed had
misled the trustor, at the time the trust deed was executed, regarding the contents of the
instrument, by including two lots, rather than one, in the trust deed.3
The Supreme Court noted that the trustee had "certain clear statutory duties" with
regard to "(1) advertisement of the sale (Sec. 57-1-25) and (2) deference to the Blodgetts'
preference as to the joint or sequential sale of the tracts (Sec. 57-1-27)," and is required to
exercise "reasonable diligence to protect the trustor's interests in the procedures incident
to the public sale." Id. at 303. The Court stated that a trustee also has a duty to "act with
reasonable diligence and good faith on [the trustor's] behalf consistent with his primary
obligation to assure the payment of the secured debt" and "a duty to treat the trustor fairly
and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor." Id. at 302, 303.

3

The Blodgetts, owners of two lots, agreed with their tenant to pledge one lot as
security for a bank loan the tenant was obtaining. The tenant obtained the loan from a
bank with whom the Blodgetts had been long-time customers and which previously had
taken from the Blodgetts a security interest in both lots to secure other Blodgett loans.
Unbeknownst to the Blodgetts, the bank prepared the trust deed to include both lots as
security for the tenant's loan, rather than only the one lot as the Blodgetts intended. Thus,
the trust deed executed by the Blodgetts erroneously pledged both lots to the bank as
security for the tenant's loan. The tenant-borrower ultimately defaulted, and the bank
appointed a substitute trustee and caused both lots to be sold at foreclosure sale. The
successor trustee failed to give the Blodgetts proper notice of the foreclosure sale as
required by statute. Nevertheless, the sale went forward and, without the Blodgetts'
knowledge, both lots were sold at the trustee's sale. Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 300-301.
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Blodgett clarifies that, while a trustee has certain statutory duties to a trustor, the
trustee does not owe a fiduciary duty to the trustor in the absence of a confidential
relationship. In Blodgett, the Court recognized that the bank, as both trustee and
beneficiary, had a fiduciary duty to the Blodgetts, not because the bank was the trustee
under the trust deed, but because the bank had a confidential relationship with the
Blodgetts arising out of their long-standing business relationship and the trust reposed by
the Blodgetts in the bank. In describing this confidential relationship, the Court stated:
If the circumstances are such that the defendant could exercise
extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and the defendant was or should
have been aware the plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the defendant
and reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then the parties are said to
be in "confidential relationship" . . . . Id. at 302.
The Court determined that, at the time the trust deed was prepared by the bank and
executed by the Blodgetts, the bank had a confidential relationship with the Blodgetts and
had committed constructive fraud by not disclosing to the Blodgetts that both lots were
included in the trust deed.
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989),
the Supreme Court addressed the "duty" of a trust deed trustee who failed to comply with
the statutory requirements for a trust deed foreclosure by sending out a notice of default
containing an inaccurate description of the property being foreclosed.4
4

Banberry purchased property from Kimball and executed a trust deed in favor of
Kimball. Kimball later subordinated his interest in the trust deed in favor of the bank.
After Banberry developed part of the property, Kimball reconveyed to Banberry some of
the pledged parcels. When Banberry defaulted on its loan, Kimball appointed a substitute
trustee under the trust deed and initiated foreclosure. The trustee recorded and mailed to
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The issue faced by the Court was whether the trustee had breached a fiduciary duty
owed to the trustor. Id. at 1256. The Court, citing the Blodgett case, stated:
Upon default, the trustee has power to sell the property to satisfy the
trustor's debt to the beneficiary. The existence of the trust itself creates a
duty between the trustee and the beneficiary. But the trustee's duty to
the beneficiary does not imply that the trustee may ignore that trustor's
rights and interests. Obviously, a trust deed trustee may not scheme to
defraud a trustor. And in cases where a trustor reposes its trust or
confidence in the trustee and relies on the trustee's guidance or where
the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor or
where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor, it is
possible that the trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the
interest of the trustor. In short, the existence of a duty between the
trustee and the trustor may be implied by the factual situation of a
particular case. In this instance, however, there is no evidence of fraud
or a relationship that would create a fiduciary duty. The trustee did not
breach a duty to the trustor. Id. (internal citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
In both Blodgett and Banberry, the Supreme Court recognized that a trustee bears
only a limited statutory duty. Any other duty owing to a trustor, such as a fiduciary duty,
is dependent upon the existence of a confidential relationship between the trustee and the
trustor, where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor and exercises
extraordinary influence over the trustor at the time the trust deed is executed.
This Court, in the case of Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App
373, 81 P.3d 105, also addressed a claim of fiduciary duty purportedly owed by a trustee
Banberry and purchasers of condos on the reconveyed property a notice of default, which
contained a faulty property description including all of the original property rather than
excluding the portion that had been reconveyed previously. Although an amended notice
excluding the reconveyed property was recorded once the error was discovered, Banberry
claimed that the initial notice caused it damage, and sued the trustee, alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1255-1256.
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to a trustor.5 The trial court found that because Heritage was both the beneficiary and
trustee it owed a fiduciary duty to the trustor, Five F. In granting Heritage's motion for
directed verdict, the trial court ruled that despite the fiduciary duty owed by Heritage to
Five F, Heritage could not be held liable where it fulfilled its obligations under the trust
deed and adhered to the requirements of the statute. Five F} 2003 UT App 373, ff 1, 10.
On appeal, this Court determined that whether Heritage had an actionable fiduciary
duty depended on whether the following circumstances or criteria declared by Banberry
Crossing existed: (1) where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and
relies on the trustee's guidance, (2) where the trustee could exercise extraordinary
influence over the trustor, and (3) where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the
trustor. Five F, 2003 UT App 373, f 17.
As established in Banberry Crossing and Five F, duties beyond those specifically
required of a trustee by statute do not arise absent a confidential or other similar
relationship between the trustor and the trustee. Where no such relationship existed
between the Russells and the Lundberg Parties, no fiduciary duty was owed.
B.

Where There Was No Confidential Relationship Between The Lundberg
Parties And The Russells. No Fiduciary Duty Was Owed.
In Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982),

the Court said:
5

Five F obtained a loan from Heritage secured by a deed of trust in which Heritage
was both the trustee and the beneficiary. When Five F defaulted on the loan, Heritage
foreclosed as permitted by statute. Five F sued for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract and unjust enrichment. Five F, 2003 UT App 373, ff 2-9.
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A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract or by
circumstances where equity will imply a higher duty in a relationship
because the trusting party has been induced to relax the care and vigilance
he would ordinarily exercise. In such a case, the evidence must
demonstrate the placement of trust and reliance such that the nature of the
relationship is clear.
The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that there was no confidential
relationship between the parties at the time the Trust Deed was signed. The Russells were
not acquainted with, or clients of, the Lundberg Parties. The Russells had never spoken
to Mr. Lundberg or his firm. The Lundberg Parties did not provide any information, or
make any representations, to the Russells at that time. Mr. Lundberg was selected by the
beneficiary, and not by the Russells, to be the trustee under the Trust Deed. The Russells
did not place any trust in, or otherwise rely on, the Lundberg Parties in any way.
There also was no confidential relationship between the parties during the three
foreclosures of the Trust Deed. The Russells had no personal, social or professional
relationship with the Lundberg Parties, before, during or after the foreclosures. Although
the Lundberg Parties provided information to the Russells regarding the amounts they
would have to pay to cure their defaults, such a ministerial act does not create or
constitute a confidential relationship between them. The Russells did not repose trust or
confidence in the Lundberg Parties or rely on their guidance in any way. The Lundberg
Parties did not exercise extraordinary influence over the Russells and did not stand in a
dominant position over them.
The foreclosures were initiated by the beneficiary, not by the Lundberg Parties.
The fact that Mr. Lundberg performed his statutory duties in connection with the
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foreclosures did not create a confidential relationship between the parties. Yet the
Russells rest their notion of confidential relationship on just such a feeble connection.
In view of the complete absence of any confidential relationship between the
Russells and the Lundberg Parties such as was found in Blodgett, and the absence of any
facts to establish the Banberry Crossing criteria articulated in Five F, this Court should
affirm the district court's decision that the Lundberg Parties owed no fiduciary duty to the
Russells, and that the Lundberg Parties were entitled to judgment on the Russells' breach
of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud claims as a matter of law.
C.

The Undisputed Evidence Establishes That Mr. Lundberg Complied With His
Statutory Duties In Foreclosing The Russells9 Trust Deed In Accordance
With The Utah Trust Deed Foreclosure Statute.
1.

A Trustee's Duties are Limited by Statute and Mr. Lundberg Complied
With All of Those Statutory Duties.

The primary duty owed by a trustee of a trust deed is to assure the payment of the
secured debt to the beneficiary. Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 303. The very definition of
beneficiary lays the foundation for this understanding. The term "beneficiary" is defined
by the statute to mean the person named or otherwise designated in the trust deed as the
person for whose benefit a trust deed is given. . . ." U.C.A. § 57-1-19(1). Further, § 571-20 states: "Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of
an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary."
The trustee is the steward of the trust deed for the benefit of the beneficiary. See U.C.A.
§§57-1-19(4) and 57-1-20.
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In addition to the "benefit," or the security for payment and performance of the
trustor's obligations, the beneficiary under the trust deed has significant statutory rights
and powers under the trust deed foreclosure statute. For example, § 57-1-22(1) provides:
The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for
record in the office of the county recorder . . . a substitution of trustee. . . .
The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee,
ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new
trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee.
And, when it comes to the manner of foreclosure, § 57-1-23 grants the following
authority to the beneficiary:
. . .after a breach of an obligation for which the trust property is conveyed
as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be
foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without
express provision therefor in the trust deed. [Emphasis added.]
As shown above, it is the beneficiary that commissions and invokes the
performance of the trustee's duties. Section 57-1-33. l(l)(a) similarly provides: "When
an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written
request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." [Emphasis added.] It is the
beneficiary that must authorize the trustee to reconvey the trust property to the trustor.
Perhaps the most telling articulation of the true statutory relationship between trustee and
beneficiary is in § 57-l-27(l)(a): "The trustee may bid for the beneficiary." The trustee
cannot act independently. The trustee does not act at the behest of the trustor.
While the trust deed foreclosure statutes are replete with references to the
relationship and rights and duties between trustee and beneficiary, the same cannot be
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said regarding the relationship between trustee and trustor. Nevertheless, a trustee clearly
does have certain statutory duties which first arise at the time of the trustor's default.6 In
performing these statutory duties, the trustee must act with reasonable diligence and good
faith with regard to the trustor, consistent with the trustee's primary obligation to assure
the payment of the secured debt. No further duty in the trustee does or can exist unless
the same has arisen as a consequence of some confidential or other extraordinary
relationship between the trustor and the trustee.
The Russells defaulted three times on their loan obligation. They cured their
default on each occasion. The conduct about which they complain against the Lundberg
Parties arose after each default, but prior to any sale of the Property. Consequently, the
only statutory duty performed by Mr. Lundberg was the giving of the applicable notices
on the three different occasions. See U.C.A. § 57-1-26(2). The Russells do not challenge
the validity of the notices. Thus, none of the trustee's statutory duties are relevant to this
case and Mr. Lundberg has breached no statutory duty.
The Russells cite at footnote 12 to Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services,
Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), a trust deed foreclosure case.7 The court in Concepts
6

Those duties are to properly give the necessary notice of default and notice of sale
(§ 57-1-26(2), (3) and (4)); to assure that the property is sold at foreclosure sale to the
highest bidder (§ 57-1-27(1)); to accept any direction from the trustor as to the order in
which multiple parcels will be sold (§ 57-1-27(1)); and, finally, to make proper
distribution of the proceeds of sale (§ 57-1-29).
7

In Concepts, the beneficiary, who was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale,
purchased the property at the sale. When the beneficiary failed to pursue its claim for a
deficiency judgment within the statutory three month period, he scheduled a second

4R42-6971-I616 LU593 001

28

held that the right to set aside a foreclosure sale was limited to circumstances when "the
interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair
dealing." Concepts, 141 P.2d at 1160. The Concepts case relies on the statutory
protections afforded to the trustor under Title 57, Chapter 1. The Lundberg Parties
recognize the existence of those statutory protections, but those protections are not called
into play under the undisputed facts of this case, and are not at issue here. There was no
foreclosure sale of the Russells' Property and the Russells' interests, which were
protected by statute, were never in peril.
The Russells also cite in footnote 12 of their brief to Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37
(Utah App. 1988),8 in support of the proposition that the procedural requirements for a
trustee's sale are intended to protect the debtor/trustor. The Lundberg Parties have
asserted all along that a trustee owes to the trustor the limited duties outlined in the trust
deed foreclosure statute.9

foreclosure sale of the property, based on a typographical error in the original notice. The
trustor then brought a declaratory judgment action to obtain an order declaring that the
first sale was valid, notwithstanding the error in the earlier notice, and that the trustee was
precluded from conducting a second sale of the property. Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1158-59.
8

In Jones, the trustor sued to set aside the foreclosure sale, alleging that the
contract creating the trust deed was unconscionable. Jones, 761 P.2d at 38. The Russells
do not assert that the underlying trust deed or any contract by which it was created was
unconscionable. Moreover, there was no foreclosure sale of the Russells' Property.
9

The Russells also cite First Security Bank v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D.
Utah 1987), for their proposition that "the purpose of the trust deed foreclosure statute is
to protect the borrower." However, Felger has no application to this case. Felger
involved two liens held by the same entity against two obligors on the same property and
merely discusses the one-action rule and merger doctrine.
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2.

The Russells Have Misconstrued the Language of § 57-1-31(1) to Imply
a Non-existent Duty Owing by the Lundberg Parties to the Russells.

The Russells claim that the Lundberg Parties were not honest with them and did
not follow the foreclosure statute when they purportedly charged the Russells inflated
amounts, in excess of the actual costs incurred in the foreclosures, to cure their defaults
and reinstate the loan. That claim is without merit.
The Lundberg Parties purchased the TSGs from Backman Stewart and on one
occasion used Rodney to post and publish the notice of sale for the foreclosures of the
Russells' Trust Deed. There certainly is nothing illegal or improper with doing so, as a
trustee is not required to perform personally each task associated with the foreclosure. To
perform his statutory duties, a trustee must obtain a TSG or title report regarding the
property being foreclosed to check the title and see what liens and encumbrances are on
the property. The trustee is not required to personally do that title work, but may pay a
title company to do so. The trustee also is not required to personally post and publish the
notices, but may hire a sheriff, constable, or other person to do so.10 That the Lundberg
Firm at one time handled the functions associated with posting and publishing the notices
of sale did not preclude it from later contracting with Rodney to perform those functions.
The basis for the Russells' claim ostensibly is that the costs for the TSGs and for
posting and publishing the notices of sale that they were required to pay to cure their
10

In the 2001 amendments to the trust deed foreclosure statute, the legislature made
it clear that a trustee may use "the services of others for publication, posting, marketing,
or advertising the sale;. . ." U.C.A. § 57-l-21.5(2)(b)(2001). The Russells' assertion that
a trustee must personally manage the posting and publication function is without merit.
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defaults were more than the costs actually incurred by the Lundberg Parties for those
items. The Russells do not contend, however, that the Lundberg Firm did not incur the
costs for the TSGs and for posting and publishing that it claimed to incur, that the
Lundberg Firm did not invoice the beneficiary for the actual amounts that it paid for those
products and services, or that the beneficiary did not reimburse the Lundberg Firm for
those costs. Instead, the Russells argue that because of Mr. Lundberg's ownership
interest in Backman Stewart and in Rodney, and the compensation derived therefrom, he
was obligated to reduce the amounts that the Russells were required to pay to cure their
defaults by some unstated amount that would represent the dividend, commission or other
financial benefit received by the Lundberg Parties. The Russells do not say what the
amount of the discount should be or even how it should or would be calculated. They do
not contend that Mr. Lundberg's interest in Backman-Stewart and in Rodney was illegal
or that for some other reason he should not have maintained those interests. The Russells
provide neither statutory nor case law support for their position. Perhaps more
importantly, they do not claim nor purport to show that the amounts charged to and paid
by them were in excess of what was reasonable and proper for the foreclosure services
provided. It is undisputed that the costs the Lundberg Parties incurred incident to the
foreclosure process was the exact amount that the Russells were required to pay to the
beneficiary to cure their defaults.
The Russells argue that § 57-1-31(1) necessarily requires that the amount of the
costs paid by the Russells to cure their defaults was to have been discounted to reflect
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amounts anticipated or actually received by the Lundberg Parties from Backman Stewart
and Rodney. Such an argument misconstrues the clear language of that provision.
The statutory language upon which the Russells rely does not apply to costs and
expenses "actually incurred" by the trustee. Rather, the statute states that in order to
reinstate the trust deed, the trustor "may pay to the beneficiary or the beneficiary's
successor in interest the entire amount then due under the terms of the trust deed
(including costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation,
or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred).. .." U.C.A. § 571-31(1) (emphasis added).
The term "actually incurred," as used in § 57-1-31(1), applies to costs and
expenses "actually incurred" by the beneficiary, not the trustee. The question, therefore,
is: what expense has the beneficiary "actually incurred"? Here, it is undisputed that the
beneficiary incurred and paid the costs for the TSGs and the posting and publishing
services that the Lundberg Firm had incurred and paid for its benefit.
Chapter 1 of Title 57 imposes no duty on the trustee to account to the trustor for
fees and costs charged to the foreclosing beneficiary but instead merely limits the
beneficiary's recovery to only such fees and costs "actually incurred."11
1

furthermore, if the trustor does not cure the default, the foreclosure proceeds to
sale. The trustee then applies the sale proceeds in accordance with § 57-1-29. The
proceeds are applied first to trustee's fees and associated attorneys' fees. See U.C.A.
§ 57-1-29. This is true whether or not the remaining sale proceeds are sufficient to satisfy
the trustor's obligation. It is the foreclosing beneficiary who has the duty to pay its
trustee and attorneys' fees. The trustor is, in turn, liable to the beneficiary for such fees
pursuant to the statute and the terms of the trust deed.
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3.

Attorneys, Acting as Trustees, Would Violate the Conflict of Interest
Provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct If the Performance of
Their Duties Imposed by the Trust Deed Foreclosure Statute Created a
Fiduciary Duty Owing to Both the Beneficiary and the Trustor,

The Utah Supreme Court has held that an attorney cannot serve two masters in
directly conflicting roles. See Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110, 113 (Utah 1985). And yet,
violation of that fundamental principle is precisely what adoption of the Russells'
arguments regarding the Lundberg Parties' obligations to the Russells would require.
Section 57-1-21 permits members of the Utah State Bar and other specified entities
with credentials of trustworthiness to act as "trustees." U.C.A. § 57-1-21; see also
Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. Mr. Lundberg is authorized to be a trust deed trustee by reason
of his membership in the Utah State Bar. But, as a member of the bar and a practicing
attorney, he is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct that are promulgated and
approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct provides that, with limited exceptions, "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client," and "[a] lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own
interest." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7.
An attorney cannot serve two masters in directly conflicting roles, but facilitating a
trust deed foreclosure with automatically concurrent duties to both the beneficiary and
trustor, as the Russells assert, would do just that. A trustee's duties are not called into
play until a trustor either fully performs the obligations owed to the beneficiary and
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secured by the trust deed or breaches those obligations. If a breach occurs, the trustee
then begins foreclosure proceedings against the trustor, clearly detrimental to the trustor's
interests. The beneficiary and trustor are in conflicting positions, and serving both would
put the attorney trustee in directly conflicting roles.
Certainly the law does not and cannot contemplate a trustee owing a fiduciary duty
simultaneously to both the beneficiary and the trustor.12 If and when a fiduciary duty is
found to be owing to a trustor, as declared by both Banberry Crossing and Five F, such a
duty must be predicated upon a confidential or similar relationship existing with the
trustor either at the time the trust deed is executed or later during its foreclosure.
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1256; Five F, 2003 UT App.373, \ 17. The directive in
Blodgett to "treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor,"
Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302, does not subordinate an attorney's foremost obligation to avoid
conflicts of interest, but necessarily addresses and measures the manner in which a
trustee's statutory duty is to be performed. Any other rule would render all attorneys
12

In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980), a case involving the
question of whether, as a matter of law, a real estate agent can hold a fiduciary duty to
both the seller and buyer, the Court said "no!" The Court went on to say that a real estate
agent is required to meet standards of honesty, integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and
competency." The Russells have made a similar assertion that there is, as a matter of law,
a fiduciary relationship between a trustee and a trustor to a trust deed. Under Utah law,
this assertion is simply untenable. As stated by the Court in Dugan, "[t]hough not
occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent
hired by the vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at
law for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the public." Id, (emphasis added). If a
real estate agent cannot have a fiduciary duty to both parties to a transaction, certainly an
attorney as trustee under a deed of trust may not do so absent some extraordinary
relationship of trust and confidence.
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unable to fulfill the duties of trustee, in direct contravention of the plain language of
U.C.A. §57-1-21.

II. MR. LUNDBERG HAD NO CONTRACTUAL DUTY
TO THE RUSSELLS BECAUSE THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR A VALID CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN MET
The Russells' third and fourth causes of action are based upon theories of contract
law. However, the undisputed evidence establishes that the Russells had no contractual
relationship with the Lundberg Parties. The Russells have failed to present evidence
establishing any agreement between them, as trustors, and Mr. Lundberg, as trustee.
Moreover, the Russells' claim that they had a contractual relationship with Mr. Lundberg
fails due to lack of consideration and a lack of privity.
The Utah Supreme Court has held: "In determining whether the parties created an
enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and
counteroffers and interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of
deciding whether the parties reached agreement on complete and definite terms." Nunley
v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1084 (Utah 1999). In this case there
were no preliminary negotiations, no offers, no counteroffers, no acceptances, and no
expression by either Mr. Lundberg or the Russells that they had reached any agreement.
As the evidence established, Mr. Lundberg had no contact with the Russells at or prior to
the time the Trust Deed was executed. Mr. Lundberg did not sign the Trust Deed.
A basic concept of contract law is that there must be consideration, which is an
"act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise." Resource
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Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah
1985). Here, Mr. Lundberg, as trustee, neither performed an act or promise for the
benefit of the Russells nor was the recipient of any act or promise performed by the
Russells. There is no consideration to support any purported contract between the parties.
There also is no privity of contract. Privity of contract is "[t]hat connection or
relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties." Blacks Law
Dictionary, 6th Ed. In this case it is clear that there is a contract between the beneficiary
and the trustor, and between the beneficiary and the trustee. However, there is no
contract between the trustee and the trustor and, therefore, no contractual duty is owed by
Mr. Lundberg to the Russells.
Finally, the Russells' claim for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
must fail because there can be no such claim absent a valid contract. "[UJnder the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that it will not
intentionally or purposely do anything [that] will destroy or injure the other party's right
to receive the fruits of the contract." Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). In
this case there is no contract and, consequently, there can be no breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF RODNEY ON THE RUSSELLS' FIDUCIARY DUTY,
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND CONTRACT CLAIMS
The Russells never had any communications or contacts, or any confidential
relationship, with Rodney. The Russells have not presented any evidence that would
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establish a statutory, contractual or fiduciary duty owed by Rodney to the Russells.
Accordingly, the district court properly granted judgment in favor of Rodney on the
Russells' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE LUNDBERG PARTIES AND RODNEY WERE ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT ON THE RUSSELLS5 OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION
A.

To Defeat A Summary Judgment Motion. The Russells Must Produce
Admissible Evidence Showing That There Is A Genuine Issue Of Material
Fact Which The Russells Have Failed To Do.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah
1983); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998).
The Russells have the ultimate burden of proving all elements of their causes of
action. See Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). As part of
their motion for summary judgment, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney, as the moving
parties, have the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support
the Russells' claims. See Celotex, All U.S. at 323; Adler, 144 F.3d at 670-71. They may
make their prima facie showing simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence on
an essential element of each of the Russells' claims. See Adler, \AA F.3d at 671.
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Once the Lundberg Parties and Rodney have carried their initial burden, the
Russells have an affirmative duty to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts,
with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 56(e). See Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124;
D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989); Adler, 144 F.3d at 671; Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e). The Russells may not rest upon the mere allegations in their pleadings, but
must present admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Hall,
671 P.2d at 226; Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In the absence of such evidence, summary
judgment may be entered. See D&L Supply, 775 P.2d at 421.
As set forth hereinafter, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney carried their burden of
showing the lack of evidence to support the Russells' claims and established that they are
entitled to judgment on those claims as a matter of law. Where the Russells failed to
produce admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the district court
properly granted summary judgment against the Russells on their remaining claims.
B.

The Russells Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Establishing Their Claim
Of Fraud Against The Lundberg Parties And Rodney,
For the Russells to prevail on their fraud claim, they must prove, among other

things, that the Lundberg Parties or Rodney made a representation concerning a presently
existing material fact, which was false and which the Lundberg Parties or Rodney knew
was false, for the purpose of inducing the Russells to act upon it, and that the Russells in
fact did rely upon it and were thereby induced to act to their injury and damage. Pace v.
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952). A person cannot be liable for fraud unless he
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made the false representations himself, authorized someone to make them for him, or
participated in the misrepresentation in some way. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746
P.2d 785, 792 (Utah App. 1987).
The evidence presented establishes that neither the Lundberg Parties nor Rodney
made any false representation to the Russells. Mr. Lundberg and Rodney never spoke to
the Russells. The only representations made by employees of the Lundberg Firm to the
Russells accurately set forth the amounts that the Russells needed to pay to the
beneficiary to cure the defaults and reinstate their loan. In particular, the amounts that the
Russells were required to pay to the beneficiary for the TSGs and the posting and
publication costs accurately reflected the actual amounts that the beneficiary, as well as
the Lundberg Firm, paid for those items.
Where the Russells have failed to present evidence of a false representation being
made by the Lundberg Parties or Rodney, as well as evidence of the other elements that
are required to prove, the district court properly granted judgment in favor of the
Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the Russells' claim for fraud.
C.

The Russells Failed To Present Admissible Evidence Establishing Their
Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Against The Lundberg Parties And
Rodney.
To prevail on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the Russells must prove that

they were injured by their reasonable reliance upon the careless or negligent
misrepresentation of a material fact by the Lundberg Parties or Rodney. See Maack v.
Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 576-77 (Utah App. 1994). Again,
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given the lack of any admissible evidence that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney made a
false representation to the Russells, the district court properly granted judgment in favor
of the Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the Russells' negligent misrepresentation claim.
D.

The District Court Correctly Ruled That the Russells Cannot Prevail On
Their Unjust Enrichment Claim As A Matter Of Law.
To prevail on their claim for unjust enrichment, the Russells must present

admissible evidence sufficient to establish the following three elements. First, there must
be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee must appreciate or
have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be "the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." American Towers Owners
Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996); Berrettv. Stevens, 690
P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1994).
The Russells are unable to satisfy these three elements. There is no evidence that
the Russells conferred any benefit on the Lundberg Parties or Rodney whatsoever. It was
the beneficiary, and not the Russells, who reimbursed the Lundberg Firm for the actual
costs advanced by it in connection with the Russell foreclosures, and it was the Lundberg
Firm, not the Russells, that paid Rodney.
The Lundberg Parties' receipt of commissions from Backman-Stewart in
recognition of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large
quantity of title work provided by Mr. Lundberg to Backman-Stewart does not constitute
a benefit conferred by the Russells, but was a benefit conferred by Backman-Stewart.
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Similarly, the commission received by Rodney from the Intermountain Commercial
Record was not a benefit conferred by the Russells.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to suggest that there is anything unjust about
the Lundberg Parties receiving and retaining the benefit provided by the commissions
given by Backman-Stewart, or anything unjust about Rodney receiving and retaining the
benefit provided by the commission it received from the ICR.
Where the Russells failed to present evidence establishing the elements of their
unjust enrichment claim, the district court properly granted judgment in favor of the
Lundberg Parties and Rodney on that claim.
E.

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail Against
The Lundberg Parties Or Rodney On Their Unfair Practices Act Claim As A
Matter of Law,
1.

The Russells Lack Standing to Assert a Claim Against the Lundberg
Parties or Rodney Under the UP A.

Standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time. Wilson v.
GlenwoodIntermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 532-93 (10th Cir. 1996).
Standing is a question of law. Wilson, 98 F.3d at 593.
Under Utah law, in order for a person to have standing to pursue a claim, the
person must be able to show that he or she has suffered some distinct and palpable injury
that gives the person a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Harris v.
Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148
(Utah 1983). It generally is insufficient for a person to assert only a general interest that
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he or she shares in common with members of the public at large. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at
1148-49.
The Russells claim that the Lundberg Parties engaged in illegal price
discrimination in violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ["UPA"], U.C.A. § 13-5-1, et
seq., by receiving commissions from Backman-Stewart. The Russells argue that the price
charged to the Lundberg Firm for TSGs was different than what Backman-Stewart
charged other persons for TSGs, if one takes into account the commissions received by
the Lundberg Parties. Primary line cases of price discrimination are brought by
competing sellers of the product in question, on the basis that the discriminatory price in
some way adversely affects competition at the level of the seller. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd. v.
The Southland Corp., 667 F.Supp. 757, 762 n. 7 (D.Utah 1987). Secondary line suits are
brought by disfavored buyers, alleging that some preferential price given to a competing
buyer harms competition at the buyer level. Id.
In this case, the Russells admit that they are not competing sellers of TSGs. They
also are not disfavored buyers of TSGs. There is no evidence that the Russells ever
purchased a TSG from Backman-Stewart. The fact that the Russells, to cure their
defaults, paid to the trust deed beneficiary an amount to cover the cost incurred by the
beneficiary to reimburse the Lundberg Firm for the TSG it purchased does not make the
Russells purchasers of TSGs.
The Russells also have not produced any evidence to suggest that they are sellers
or buyers of the publishing services offered by the Intermountain Commercial Record.
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The Russells have presented no evidence that the commissions paid by BackmanStewart to the Lundberg Parties or the commissions paid by ICR to Rodney have lessened
or destroyed competition for them or created a monopoly that has damaged them.
Where the Russells have not suffered any distinct or palpable injury as a result of
the commissions received by the Lundberg Parties from Backman-Stewart, or the
commissions received by Rodney from ICR, the Russells lack standing to assert a claim
against the Lundberg Parties or Rodney under the UPA.
2.

The UPA Does Not Apply to the Transactions at Issue in this Action
and the Lundberg Parties And Rodney Have Not Violated the UPA,

The purpose of the UPA is to safeguard the public against the creation or
perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting
unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or
prevented. U.C.A. § 13-5-17. The UPA specifically prohibits discrimination in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them. U.C.A. § 13-5-3(l)(a).
It is not every discrimination in price that is outlawed by the UPA, but only those
which tend to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Burt v.
Woolsulate, Inc., 146 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1944); Utah Foam Products Co. v. The Upjohn
Co., 154 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 1998). The party alleging illegal pricing
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discrimination bears the burden of showing that the illegal conduct may have substantially
impacted competition. Utah Foam, 154 F.3d at 1217.
The undisputed evidence in this case is that the price Backman-Stewart charged
the Lundberg Firm for the TSGs purchased in connection with the foreclosures of the
Russells' Trust Deed was the same price that Backman-Stewart charged other customers
for similar TSGs. That being the case, there is no price discrimination and the Russells'
claim fails as a matter of law.
This result is not altered by the fact that Backman-Stewart paid commissions to the
Lundberg Parties in recognition of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in BackmanStewart and the large volume of business that he provided to Backman-Stewart. The
Utah Legislature expressly recognized that it is totally appropriate for a seller to charge a
lower price to one buyer than to another where there is a difference in the quantities of the
product being purchased by the one as compared to the quantities of the product being
purchased by the other. Section 13-5-3(l)(b)(i) of the UPA provides as follows:
(b)

Nothing in this chapter shall prevent:
(i)

differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
different methods or quantities in which such commodities are
to such purchasers sold or delivered.

In view of this provision, Backman-Stewart's action in paying commissions to the
Lundberg Parties in recognition of the large quantities of TSGs and other title products
and services purchased from Backman-Stewart by the Lundberg Parties cannot be
considered a violation of the UPA.
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This is particularly true where Mr. Lundberg had an ownership interest in
Backman-Stewart at the time. The fact that the Lundberg Parties purchased most of the
TSGs that they needed from a title company that was owned in part by Mr. Lundberg did
not constitute anti-competitive conduct but rather sound business practice. Mr. Lundberg
had no obligation to purchase TSGs from each and every title company in town. His
doing business with a company that he partially owns, and receiving commissions for
business produced for that company, is not prohibited by the UPA.
There is no evidence to suggest that the business relationship between BackmanStewart and the Lundberg Parties lessened competition in the title insurance industry.
Regardless of whether the Lundberg Parties received a commission or not, Mr. Lundberg
still would have taken his business to the company in which he is an owner. Thus,
competition was not affected by the commissions received by the Lundberg Parties.
There also is no evidence to suggest that the relationship between BackmanStewart and the Lundberg Parties gave Backman-Stewart a monopoly in the industry. To
the contrary, even after the Lundberg Parties decided to send their business to BackmanStewart, there continued to be many title insurance companies that offered TSGs to
customers in the State of Utah.13

13

In the district court, the Russells also alleged that the commissions paid to the
Lundberg Parties by Backman-Stewart violated § 13-5-3(3) of the UPA. That section is
patterned after § 2(c) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c). The analysis of § 2(c) of the
Clayton Act contained in the Lundberg Parties' memorandum in support of their motion
for summary judgment on the remaining causes of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint [R.
627-631.] clearly shows that the Lundberg Parties did not violate § 13-5-3(3) of the UPA.
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For similar reasons, the Russells' claims against Rodney under the UP A also are
without merit. ICR's agreement to pay a commission to Rodney, based upon the large
volume of business which it provided to ICR, is not prohibited by the UP A. The Russells
have produced no evidence to show that ICR would not provide similar commissions to
other customers who provide the volume of business provided by Rodney. The Russells
have presented no evidence to show that this arrangement between Rodney and ICR
lessened competition or gave ICR a monopoly in the industry.
K

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Lundberg Parties And Rodney
Were Entitled To Judgment Against The Russells On Their Civil Conspiracy
Claim.
Under Utah law, to prove a civil conspiracy, the Russells must prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, the following elements:
(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished,
(3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more
unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof.
Israel Pagan Estate, 746 P.2d at 790.
The Russells have presented no evidence to suggest that the Lundberg Parties
conspired with anyone regarding the Russell foreclosures or otherwise sought to defraud
them or subject them to any unlawful act. The Lundberg Parties simply performed the
duties of the trustee in connection with the foreclosures. They purchased TSGs to obtain
accurate information regarding the property being foreclosed, and to protect them and the
beneficiary from any damages caused by any erroneous information contained therein.
The Lundberg Parties also contracted with Rodney to handle the posting and publishing
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of the notice of sale in connection with the third foreclosure. The actual amounts paid by
the Lundberg Firm for the TSGs and for the posting and publishing services were billed
to, and reimbursed by, the beneficiary, who in turn charged those same amounts to the
Russells to cure their defaults and reinstate their loan. None of those acts involved a
conspiracy or constituted an unlawful act.
Backman-Stewart's payment of commissions to the Lundberg Parties did not
constitute an unlawful act against the Russells, but rather was a legitimate business
transaction. Similarly, the fact that Rodney was paid a commission by the Intermountain
Commercial Record cannot be construed as a wrongful act against the Russells.
In order to carry their burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence
supporting their conspiracy theory, the Russells must present evidence that does more
than merely raise a suspicion; rather, it must lead to the belief that the conspiracy existed.
Id, 746 P.2d at 793; Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978). To be sufficient,
such evidence must show that the circumstances are consistent only with the existence of
a conspiracy. Israel Pagan Estate, 746 P.2d at 793 (emphasis added). Evidence is
insufficient if it discloses acts just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful
one. Id.
Common sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should not be
permitted to be drawn from routine business transactions where there are no
other transactions. To hold otherwise would throw the door open for an
attack on each and every transaction that one might enter into.
Id.; Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P.2d 700, 702 (1956).

4842-6971-1616 LU593 001

47

The undisputed facts in this case reveal no conspiracy, but simply legitimate
business dealings. The Russells have failed to establish the elements of a civil
conspiracy, and the district court properly granted judgment on the civil conspiracy claim.
G.

The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Russells Cannot Prevail On
Their Punitive Damages Claim As A Matter of Law.
The law is clear that there is no separate and distinct cause of action for punitive

damages. A punitive damages claim must be based on an underlying cause of action. 22
Am Jur 2d, Damages at § 741 (1988). Section 78-18-l(a) of the Utah Code expressly
provides that punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages
are awarded. Where the Lundberg Parties and Rodney were entitled to summary
judgment on all of the Russells' other causes of action against them, there remained no
underlying cause of action on which the Russells could base their punitive damage claim.
Moreover, punitive damages may be awarded only if it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of the
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the Russells5 rights.
U.C.A. § 78-18-1(a). The Russells have failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that would justify an award of punitive damages against the Lundberg Parties or Rodney.
Based on the foregoing, the district court correctly granted judgment in favor of
the Lundberg Parties and Rodney on the Russells' punitive damages claim.
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H.

The Court Should Summarily Affirm The District Court's Order Granting
Summary Judgment In Favor Of The Lundberg Parties And Rodney On The
Causes Of Action Not Addressed In The Russells' Appeal Brief,
The Russells have not argued in their appeal brief that the district court erred in

granting judgment against them on their claims for restitution based on mistake of fact or
mistake of law, tortious payment of money, wrongful collection, or liability for intended
consequences.14 That being the case, the Court should affirm the district court's decision
granting judgment against the Russells on those claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney respectfully request
that the Court affirm the orders of the district court.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2004.
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Gary A. Weston
Richard M. Hymas
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellees J. Scott Lundberg,
Lundberg & Associates, and Rodney Service
Company
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The Lundberg Parties and Rodney were entitled to judgment on those claims for
the reasons set forth in their memoranda filed with the district court [R. 482-485, 609618, 893-895] and in the district court's Memorandum Decision dated August 14, 2003
[R. 975-981] and Order Granting the Lundberg Parties5 Motion for Summary Judgment
on the Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Granting Rodney Service
Co.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting The Backman Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class dated
September 8, 2003 [R. 999-1003.]
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